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Putting Context to Numbers: A Geotechnical Risk Trajectory to Cost Overrun Extremism 
Abstract 
The study investigates the cause of the unusually high cost overruns experienced 
in highway project delivery in the tropical wetland setting of the Niger Delta 
region of Nigeria. This is in view of the extensive literature supporting the link 
between geology, the lack of geotechnical best practices and cost overruns. An 
empirical profiling of cost overrun research further reveals the predominance of 
mono-method studies based on survey methods, correlative analysis and archival 
data modelling techniques, all of which are underlain by positivism. The study 
argues that such positivist philosophies, although methodologically valid, cannot 
adequately explain and provide in-depth understanding of the contextual cost 
overrun drivers in highway organisations., Using a robust and thoughtfully 
designed mix of methods, the paper examines the contribution of geotechnical 
risks to cost overruns experienced in highway project, and demonstrates the 
relevance of context in cost overrun research. Cost overrun data from 
documentary sources for 61 completed highway projects in the Niger Delta are 
gathered and analysed, revealing an average value of 216%, with extreme cases, 
ranging up to 1925% of budgeted cost. To uncover the intrinsic contextual 
drivers, 16 interviews were conducted with participants from the three highway 
agencies in the region, responsible for the execution of the sampled highway 
projects. Adopting a geotechnical narrative, the data is thematically analysed, 
deductively and inductively. The results of the analysis identified that poor 
project governance, management and procurement practices, have inhibited the 
competent management of geotechnical risk, creating a propensity for extreme 
cost overruns on the highway projects.  The study submits the phenomenon of 
cost overruns in public infrastructure projects is underlain by a complexity of 
contextual social constructs, which would have been overlooked in positivists 
studies. Cost overrun research therefore, needs to be contextually and 
numerically anchored. 
Keywords: Context, Cost overruns, Highway projects, Mixed methods, Social 
Constructs 
Introduction 
The consequences of cost overruns in highway projects have raised questions about the 
efficiency of governments and more specificially the organisations tasked with delivering public 
highway investment to initiate and deliver highway infrastructure projects throughout the 
developed and developing world. The phenomenon of cost overruns in highway projects has 
consequently attracted profuse scholarly attention. Including seminal studies such as those 
undertaken by Wachs (1989) and later Flyvbjerg et al. (2002). As well as numerous recent 
studies such as those undertaken by Love et al., (2012, 2016, 2017), Ahiagu-Dugbai et al. 
(2014, 2015, 2017) and Love (2015) Collectively these studies have once again advocated the 
need to explore and critique the potential factors giving rise to cost overruns in transportation 
projects.  
 
The literature reports cost overruns figures of varying degrees in transportation projects located 
across the globe. With Flyvbjerg et al. (2009) espousing cost overruns ranging up to 50 per cent 
are common, whereas cost overruns above 100 per cent are unusual. Typically, isolated cases of 
unusually high cost overruns such as those experienced on the Chanel-tunnel in Britain, The Big 
Dig- A central artery tunnel in Boston and the Edinburgh Trams project in Scotland, have thus 
constituted detailed case studies in the cost overrun literature (Creedy, 2006; Ahiagu-Dugbai et 
al., 2014). Highway commissioners on these projects have stereotypically attributed these 
unusually high cost overruns to project uncertainties including: complexity, scope creep, 
unforeseen geological conditions and the impacts of conflicting stakeholder pressures. 
(Flyvbjerg et al., 2009). 
 
In the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, adverse ground conditions have been repeatedly identified 
by highway agencies as the principle justification for the extreme cost escalations recorded on 
highway projects, with most, if not all, completed highway projects recording significantly high 
cost overrun figures. Okon (2009) quoted cost overrun figures as high as 500% associated with 
some of the completed highway projects in the region. In 2012, a Presidential Projects 
Assessment Committee (PPAC) was set up to explore the extent of cost overrun in Highway 
projects undertaken in the Niger Delta region. The inquiry discovered that between 2005 and 
2011, 609 projects were initiated, of which 222 (37%) have been completed, 102 (16%) were on 
going and 285 (47%) have been abandoned. The committee’s final report was highly critical of 
the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), the highway agency responsible for the 
construction of new highway networks in the region from 2001. As part of their scathing 
analysis, the committee’s report highlighted: 
 
“…the unjustifiable introduction of astronomical variations on the contracts sum of 
most projects over short periods of time, with some of these variations effected 
prior to project commencement”. (PPAC, 2012:13).  
 
Several empirical studies, including those undertaken by Sunjka and Jacob (2013) as well as 
Ihuah and Benibo (2014) contend unclear definitions of contract terms and poor project 
administration by the highway agencies, have caused significant cost overruns, delays and 
abandonment of highway projects. The modalities of contract award and execution by highway 
agencies in the Nigeria is thus generally criticised in the literature, as being poorly packaged, 
with contractors standing to benefit from this shortcoming. This view is further reinforced by 
the World Bank’s (2000) Country Procurement Assessment Report (CPAR) for Nigeria, and a 
recent communique issued at the National Project Cost Reduction Summit (2017).  Collectively 
these pronouncements espouse the need to align best practice into highway project delivery in 
the region, with calls for setting up highway construction cost information system and database 
to ensure good governance and accountability. From the extant literature, it is clear academics, 
professionals and funding organisations are universally critical of the highway infrastructure 
procurement climate in Nigeria. Espousing this to be fraught with numerous anomalies, which 
in turn account for extreme cost overruns on projects. 
 
Yet, consistent referrals to lack of geotechnical best practice by the highway agencies have also 
been cited. Several empirical studies (Mansfield et al., 1994; Okpala and Aniekwu, 1998; 
Ajibade and Odeyinka, 2006; Ubani and Ononuju, 2013) have identified issues, including: weak 
and insufficient technical studies and preliminary engineering, design and specification 
deficiencies as well as inaccurate budgetary and engineering design estimates as contributing to 
the high spate of prolonged project delays and abandonment, often spanning years, and in 
extreme cases, decades (NDES, 1997). As such whether competent geotechnical evaluation is 
undertaken before the commencement of major highway projects in the region remains in doubt.  
 
This is especially significant given the geological nature of the Niger Delta, which as an 
archetypal tropical delta. Consequently it is crisscrossed by a myriad of streams, rivers and 
inland water channels (Oguara, 2002). Its terrain consists of varying geological formations, with 
a significant proportion having difficult expansive clayey sub-soils (Teme, 2002). Logically this 
implies that any form of construction work in this heterogeneous terrain will invariably 
encounter distinct technical and financial connotations (Oguara, 2002, Youdoewei, 2013, 
Ngerebara et al., 2014). Considering the peculiar terrain of the Niger Delta, the views of several 
authors in the literature are convergent in underscoring the need to manage and analyse 
uncertainties associated with the difficult geology, in the delivery of highway infrastructure 
projects (Oguara, 2002, Teme, 2002, Youdoewei, 2013, Ngerebara et al., 2014).  
As a result of the extensive literature supporting the link between geology, the lack of 
geotechnical best practices, and cost and time overruns, the study examines the contribution of 
geotechnical risks to cost overruns experienced in highway project delivery in the Niger Delta. 
The study in adopting this geotechnical trajectory to investigate the phenomena of extreme cost 
overruns, however recognizes and does not dispute other potential confounding variables, which 
may underlie the propensity for highway projects in the region to exceed initial cost figures by 
such wide margins. 
 
Literature Review 
The cost performance of construction projects is often identified as a fundamental 
measure of success for project sponsors. Yet against this, a large number of construction 
projects documented in the public domain, have been censured for notoriously running over 
their original budget estimate. Cost overrun in construction projects remains a topical issue, 
with the media, technical press, and scholarly literature, rife with publications analysing cost 
overrun trends, identifying their primary causes, and offering broader explanations for this 
pervasive trend. This section reviews the nomenclature of the empirical literature on the 
problem of cost overruns in construction projects. 
 
Studies Analysing Structured Responses 
An analysis of the literature on cost overruns reveal a predominant leaning towards the 
use of survey researches, mostly based on analysis of questionnaire surveys which sample the 
opinions of construction professionals. See for example Mansfield et al., 1994; Chang 2002; 
Aibinu and Odeyinka, 2006; Kaliba, et al., 2008; Memon et al., 2011. These studies often 
generate a long list of factors, which are sometimes subsequently ranked. Aibinu and Odeyinka, 
(2006) identified 44 factors, prioritising the 39 factors on a ranked profile, as a source of useful 
information for construction industry stakeholders, in curbing delays and cost overruns. Some 
other authors including Cantarelli et al. (2010); Allahahium and Lui (2011) and Brunes and 
Lind, (2014) have taken the evidence one step further, by seeking to categorize and classify the 
myriad of causative variables identified, into a typology of causes, on the grounds that 
generating a long list of factors, without tracing their fundamental defining characteristics, was 
insufficient. For example, Allahahium and Liu (2011), analysed 90 causes of cost overruns, 
identifying five major triggers for cost overruns including: (1) Market volatility principally due 
to micro and macro-economic variations; (2) novelty/unpredictable events such as unexpected 
ground conditions; (3) estimate distortion; (4) time pressures and finally (5) project complexity.   
The methodology of listing factors, ranking, and categorizing causative variables, based 
on impersonal questionnaire surveys, which is the most rudimental and simplistic approach to 
explaining cost overruns, appears to have flooded the literature. Although this adds to the body 
of scholarly literature on cost overruns, and are methodologically valid, the researchers believe 
that these forms of empirical analysis cannot be used as a basis for inferring specific cause-
effect relationship. With Ahiagu Dugbai et al. (2014:868), describing the bulk of cost overrun 
research, as replicative, stating:   
“It is argued that questionnaires alone may not be suitable for investigating 
complex and systemic problems like cost overrun on construction projects… It is 
no surprise that the same factors seem to come top of the list most of the time ...”. 
 
This characteristic feature of questionnaire based studies, limits the usefulness of the output of 
such research, in generating context specific explanations that can be relied on in practice. 
However, a scant number of studies based on questionnaire surveys, are 
methodologically more robust (Memon and Rahman, 2013; Sharma and Goyal, 2014). These 
studies have gone a step further to develop explanatory relationships amongst the identified 
costoverrun factors. For instance, Memon and Rahman (2013) investigated the effect of cost 
overrun factors based on survey responses of client, contractor, and consultant representative 
involved in handling small scale projects in Malaysia. A total of 54 survey responses were 
analysed using the Partial Least Square Structural Equation Modelling, a form of factor 
analysis, to model the relationship amongst various factors. The outcome of the analysis 
revealed latent factors which triggered the highest variance: contractor’s site management 
related factors, had the most significant effect on small scale projects. Whereas Sharma and 
Goyal (2014) developed a fuzzy logic model for assessing cost overrun, based on a preliminary 
questionnaire survey, conducted to judge the level of importance of the identified factors.  This 
was used in mapping out decision trees on an input and output basis, complemented by 
graphical representation of the variation induced by different combination of cost overrun 
factors, to understand their combined effect. Sharma and Goyal (2014) fuzzy model showed that 
the largest hypothetical variation in cost overrun will be largely due to inadequate planning and 
scheduling, followed by variation due to short bid preparation time and experience of 
contractor. 
However, a discernible shortcoming of the models, developed by both Memon and 
Rahman (2013) and Sharma and Goyal (2014), is that the data used in their analysis was not 
sourced in relation to specific projects or based of any form of project information. These 
studies relied solely on the general opinions of construction professionals, to infer abstract 
statistical inferences about the generality of factors that lead to cost overruns. It is thus probable 
that these models can explain the relationships amongst the cost overrun factors, but may have 
little explanatory power to account for recorded cost overruns on a project specific basis. This 
can be rationalised in lieu of the fact that technically projects are unique, which is in stark 
contrast to the underlying assumptions of the findings of these studies. Furthermore, matters of 
sensitive dependence arise, in the generalisability of the study by Memon and Rahman (2013) 
with respect to small scale projects in Malaysia, as the study assumes that projects of a similar 
size will experience similar issues. 
Studies Advancing Spurious Correlations 
In addition to the afore mentioned groups of cost overrun studies, few others provide and 
analyse cost overrun data, to test specific project variables in accounting for the trend in the 
data, as explanations for the cost overruns. Typically, Hinze and Gregory (1991), empirically 
tested for the effects of project size, location and complexity on the level of cost overruns 
experienced on projects executed by the Washington State Department of Transport.  Flyvbjerg 
et al. (2002, 2004), conducted a similar study, from a sample of 254 transportation 
infrastructure projects drawn from countries in different regions, mostly located in the northern 
hemisphere. Akoa (2011) conducted a study on highway projects in Cameroun.  These studies 
concluded that the bigger sizes and complexity of infrastructure projects are correspondingly 
reflected in the increased levels of cost overrun. Hinze and Gregory (1991), further inferred, that 
the simultaneous nature of projects execution by highway agencies, invariably implied lesser 
amounts of pre-and post-contract engineering hours available to each, thus accounting for the 
higher levels of cost overruns often induced in highway projects. Additional engineering, was 
thus stated as requisite, to overcome risks occasioned by the complex and simultaneous nature 
of highway project execution, which often creates a propensity for such projects to run over 
budget. Whereas, Flyvbjerg et al. (2004), asserted that the average length of implementation 
phase of transportation projects significantly impacted on the level of cost overruns recorded. 
This was inferred based on an analysis of cost overruns experienced on bridges, tunnels, and 
roads, which showed that cost overruns varied in relation to project duration. Bridges and 
tunnels, with average duration of 6.6 years recorded higher cost overruns than rail and road 
projects with an average duration of 6.3 and 4.3 years. Flyvbjerg et al. (2004:15) thus 
concluded, sluggish planning and implementation of transportation projects had direct financial 
repercussions, stating: “Sluggishness may, quite simply, be extremely expensive”. 
However, other studies, such as those by Odeck (2004) in Norway, revealed that larger 
cost overruns were experienced on smaller projects. Morris (1990) also arrived at a similar 
conclusion for 290 Indian projects analysed. Yet, contrary to the findings of these studies, Love 
et al. (2013) revealed that cost overruns do not vary by project type or size.  The conflicting 
results, from various studies, further reinforces the discernible shortcoming of these studies, that 
conclusive inference is mostly drawn based on exploratory statistical analysis. Typically, the 
use of correlation analysis, which by virtue of reporting significant association between 
bivariate groups of variables, cannot be used to conclusively infer causality. These studies thus 
assume that the dependent variable (Cost overrun) changes solely because of the independent 
variables (project size, project type and complexity). Citing the popularly used phrase in 
statistics: ‘Correlation does not necessarily imply causation’. 
Studies Analysing Causation Based on Project Data  
Quantitative analytical techniques, which analyse cause-effect relationships, are 
generally grouped as mathematical models (An et al., 2007). Models are reductions of reality 
replicating an intricate system using variables within those systems (Ahiagu Dugbai, et al., 
2014). Mathematical models have however been scantly used in the literature to infer causality 
in relation to project cost overruns. The techniques which have being used to analyse cost 
overrun in a limited number of older and more contemporary studies include: Linear modelling 
techniques such as regression modelling, networking and data mining techniques such as 
artificial neural networks, heuristics based models such as case based reasoning, stochastic 
techniques such as monte-carlo simulations; and logic based methods such as binary logistic 
modelling and fuzzy logic (Love, 2002; Trost and Oberlender, 2003; Attala and Hegazy, 2003; 
Ahiagu Dugbai et al., 2014; Lee and Kim, 2015 and El-Kholy, 2015) 
Typically, older studies such as Trost and Oberlender (2003) as well as Attala and 
Hegazy (2003) have used linear modelling techniques, based on regression analysis, to analyse 
cause-effect relationships in explaining recorded cost overruns in projects, and further tested the 
validity of these models with respect to their use in decision making for future projects, at 
specified levels of confidence. A more recent study by El-Kholy (2015) generated a regression 
based model, while comparing its predictive capacity to a Case Based Reasoning (CBR) model 
for similar data sets derived from 30 projects.  The outcome of the study showed that the 
regression modelling had higher levels of accuracy to predict potential cost overrun in projects. 
El-Kholy (2015) further applied a CBR model to predict the likely cost overrun given the degree 
of similarity of the project characteristics. El-Kholy (2015) used this method to analyse cost 
overrun factors, whose presence as part of a future project, is indicative of a potential to result in 
a similar degree of cost overrun, useful in reference class forecasting and decision making for 
future projects. Ahiagu Dugbai et al. (2014) used data mining techniques based on artificial 
neural networks, to analyse the complexity of non-linear interactions amongst quantitative 
project variables such as compensation events, project duration, as well as qualitative 
information on tendering method, location, project type, fluctuation measure and project’s 
delivery partner. Lee and Kim (2015) used monte-carlo simulations to analyse the statistical 
distribution of change orders issued during the construction period, which lead to significant 
cost overruns. Love et al. (2013) developed a probabilistic log-logistic distribution of cost 
overruns for 49 road projects (new roads including upgrades and elevated highways) in relation 
to rework occasioned by errors and omissions in contract documentation, leading to cost 
overruns.  
Although this class of technical studies on cost overruns which rely on modelling to 
understand cause-effect relationship, have a robust and methodologically valid underpinning, 
rooted in the specifics of project data, with a direct applicability useful in monitoring and 
reassessing future projects, there is a discernible lack of context.  
Geotechnical Practises as Contextual Cost-Overrun Drivers in Highway Projects 
Ground conditions have been repeatedly asserted to account for a huge percentage of the 
technical risk posed to highway development, due to its complex interfaces with the design and 
construction of transportation projects (ICE, 2001). As numerous case histories have shown, 
failure to anticipate ground conditions can have severe financial implications for projects 
(NEDO, 1988; DETR, 2014). It is thus a requirement of best practice that a well-structured 
application of risk management in general and geotechnical risk management in particular, is 
fundamental to avert cost overruns in transportation infrastructure (Staveren. and Meer, 2007).   
It has however been argued that variations due to unexpected site or soil conditions may 
be unavoidable. (National Economic Development Office, 1988). With Wong (2010) 
categorising contractual risks due to ground conditions as ‘foreseeable’, ‘unforeseen’, and 
‘unforeseeable’. The distinction being that foreseeable ground risks are those that can be 
reasonably anticipated, while unforeseen risks are those that were unanticipated due to 
incompleteness or short comings in the investigations. Unforeseeable risks on the other hand, 
were defined as those risks that cannot be eliminated, and are therefore beyond the contractors 
control, regardless of the level of experience on his part or how much ground investigation is 
undertaken. This implies that although competent geotechnical risk management may not 
completely eliminate risks due to the ground, it can to a great extent, minimise it.  
This brings to the fore, the human factor in geotechnical risk management. As empirical 
studies by Bea (2006) and Sowers (1993) reveal, differences in risk perceptions, awareness and 
knowledge may contribute to poor geotechnical risk management. Documentary analysis of 600 
projects showed that 80% of post contract issues were triggered by non-technical factors, such 
as organizational and knowledge uncertainties. This outcome aligns with findings by Sowers 
(1993), who reported that 88 % out of 500 project failures were caused by human shortcomings, 
while technological shortcomings accounted for the remaining 12 %. With Brandt (2004) 
asserting “There are no insurmountable weak soils or rock, there are only weak engineers”.  
Potential shortcomings in organizational practice thus represent an additional layer of 
avoidable financial risk, compounding the inherently unforeseeable elements of ground risks. 
This has led to arguments in the wider cost overrun literature that consistent referrals to 
unexpected geologic features as accounting for cost overruns in transportation projects, may be 
systematic and not erroneous, in view of the advancement in risk analysis and tools for 
managing risks (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002, 2004, 2009). Such deviations from geotechnical best 
practice within highway agencies, which would have implications for the accuracy of projected 
cost estimates, and logically constitute cost overrun drivers contextual to highway 
organizations, are thus reviewed.   
Geotechnical Trajectories to Cost Overruns 
Accuracy in cost estimating under conditions of uncertainty is typical of most construction 
projects. For road works, the level of accuracy of cost forecasts made is determined by the 
contributory cost variables that are captured in that estimate (Chou, 2005). Therefore, the limit 
to which cost overruns can be averted is bounded by the risk factors accounted for in projected 
estimates (Turouchy et al, 2011).  Such typical limiting factor is ground conditions. With 
routing of highways characteristically being predicated on the outcome of ground 
investigations, necessary to avoid particularly difficult subsoils, to achieve value for money 
(ICE, 2001).  
Adequately defining ground conditions at increasing levels has been advocated as a 
fundamental measure of geotechnical risk management, necessary to ensure higher levels of 
accuracy in projected cost figures (Reiley et al., 1994; Evans and Peck, 2009; Romero and 
Stolz, 2009). The literature in this section thus x-rays the various routes through which 
mismanaged geotechnical risks can potentially trigger cost overruns, from the conceptual and 
detailed estimate phase of cost estimation, to the tendering/contractual phase of highway project 
procurement.  
At the conceptual phase, Turouchy et al. (2001) reports that, earthworks/pavement cost, 
with the associated preliminary engineering, represented the most difficult cost item to estimate 
at the conceptual phase of highway project development, and often accounted for the largest 
deviations from final cost. Based on a survey of 32 highway agencies, Chou (2005) reported 
that during budget projections, most highway agencies deployed estimating methods, based on 
cost per-mile tables, with adjustment made for project specific incidentals, using informal 
engineering judgment, resulting in highly inaccurate forecasts as potential variations in ground 
profile are not captured. Chou (2005) thus opined that the prevalence of such practices, despite 
the wide variety of quantitative analytical techniques, may be due to the speed and ease of their 
applicability, low risk perception or lack of skills to use more advanced conceptual estimation 
techniques. In contrast, Turouchy et al. (2001) reported that the few highway agencies which 
dedicate a relatively large amount of financial and human resources to preliminary engineering, 
and had very low deviations from their initial cost estimates. This supports the viewpoint of 
Romero and Stolz (2009) that for transportation projects which have a high level of interface 
with the ground, the use of ‘off-the-shelve historical data in budgeting was not adequate, 
resulting in estimates which are no more than just guestimates. With, Flyvbjerg et al., (2002) 
arguing: “ignoring or underplaying geological risk may be helpful in getting projects approved, 
but no other risk factor is more likely to boomerang back and haunt projects during 
construction” (p. 281). 
Furthermore, an inadequately costed contract, with the contract price built up based on 
incomplete details of the ground or incorrect assumptions represents a medium whereby 
geotechnical risk may not be captured. Typically, in terms of pavement cost, inadequate ground 
investigations may lead to inappropriate pavement designs causing underestimation of material 
costs, as the combined thickness and material specification of the structural layers, from sub-
grade to surfacing, will vary per soil type (TRRL, 1993). Failure to adequately evaluate the 
geotechnical properties of the highway route may also result in increased costs for 
bridge/culvert construction, drainage works, and scour protection. Comprehensive geotechnical 
investigation is equally a precursor to the selection of appropriate methods of construction, and 
as such can lead to the underestimation of method and time related charges in the computation 
of detailed estimates. Adequate geotechnical evaluation is thus fundamental to managing 
ground in the preparation of project estimates ultimately shaping the cost profile of the financial 
inputs of material, labour and equipment necessary for the construction of highways.  
 
 
At the procurement phase of highway projects, the dynamics of geotechnical risk 
aversion and the strategic behavior of clients and contractors also has important implications for 
the accuracy of project final outturn cost. As Moleenar et al. (2006:31) reiterates: “The contract 
is a vehicle for risk allocation ... it defines the roles and responsibilities for risks… contractual 
misallocation of risk has been found to be a leading cause of construction disputes and 
overruns”. Providing geotechnical investigations reports as part of contract documentation can 
be identified as a form of geotechnical risk containment.  A note of caution is, however, 
sounded by O’ Toole (2006), who raises valid concerns about the accuracy and 
representativeness of such ground investigation reports, suggesting that where incomplete or 
inaccurate reports are used as a basis of financial and risk assessments by contractors, the client 
faces significant financial risk due to contractual change events resulting from report 
inaccuracies. As a result, case law related to construction projects, is rife with cases where the 
core argument revolves around the issue of non-representative ground investigation reports.  
Best practice thus advocates for resort to the use of Differing Site Condition clauses in 
contracts, which would mean paying for those conditions that could not have been revealed in 
detailed investigations. However, some forms of contracts resort to including ‘Site Inspection 
Clauses’ stipulating that contractors carry out all requisite inspections, are thus liable for 
unexpected conditions of the ground. The preceding arguments indicate a divergence between 
practices, as some highway agencies tow the latter, and try to transfer the risk associated with 
the ground conditions to contractors in their misguided notion of ensuring certainty of final 
outturn cost (Harrison, 1981; Geddes, 1985; Chan and Au, 2007).  Such practices lead to 
inadequate containment of geotechnical risks due to potentially undetected ground conditions, 
with contractors having to rely on guesswork to project estimates, which are forwarded in bids.  
This may be further compounded whereby clients opt to award contracts on a lowest 
bidder basis, at the risk of contractor’s incompetence (Crowley and Hancher, 1995). Such 
practice contravenes best practice, which emphasizes the need for an informed unbiased 
appraisal of contractors’ technical capabilities relative to bid price using quantitative multi-
parameter models (Gransberg and Gad, 2014). Such comprehensive approaches to contractor 
selection require the assignment of relative weighting of critical geotechnical factors, 
aggregated in deciding on the winning bid. Minimal geotechnical requirements relative to other 
factors may thus be necessitated under routine construction work in better ground conditions, 
with higher requirements in more complex projects or in adverse difficult ground conditions. 
Remarking on the preceding scenario, as a financial gamble by clients, Chan and Au (2007:3) 
opined that: “The owner risks tragedy, first, from cost-cutting measures the contractor will take 
if it hits unforeseen conditions, and then, from fighting contractor claims and picking up the 
pieces if the contractor abandons the project or goes bankrupt”.  
The lack of comprehensive and accurate geotechnical investigations; the nature of 
costing methodology deployed- which determines the quality of estimates relied on, as well as a 
lack of well-articulated geo-risk allocation and contractor selection measure by highway 
agencies in the procurement of projects, may compromise the efficient management of 
geotechnical risks. Table 1, summarises the various potential pitfalls in organisational practise 
which may trigger underestimation of geotechnical risks. 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
The outlined geotechnical trajectories thus constitute contextual barriers in the practices 
of highway organisations that can potentially lead to variations, costly disputes and delays, 
invariably affecting the ability of highway projects to be completed under budgeted cost.  
 Research Methodology 
The empirical profiling of cost overrun research has revealed the predominance of mono-
method studies based on questionnaire survey methods, correlative analysis and archival data 
modelling techniques, all of which are underlain by positivism, which relies on the reduction of 
ideas into discrete numeric measures of observation (Cresswell, 2003). The artificial and 
intensively structured nature of positivist approaches cannot capture the characteristic features 
in organizations, such as how the hierarchy of authority impacts on practice. The implication 
being that facts which can only be relayed via the richness of data from descriptive narratives, 
will be missed out. As Dainty (2008:7) posits: “An enduring adherence to the positivist 
paradigm will do little to enable construction management researchers to grasp the meaning of 
social action from the perspective of the actors involved”. Love et al. (2012) were of similar 
view, observing that providing details useful to provide a history to projects, is mostly lacking 
in cost overrun research. With Ahiagu-Dugbai et al. (2014), arguing that there needs to be more 
useful and robust research, targeted at understanding the propagation of cost overruns. The lack 
of context evident in the predominant leaning to numbers, thus constitutes the argument in this 
study.  
In response to the gap identified in the literature, this study is structured, as a distinctive 
and significantly robust departure from previous empirical studies on cost overruns. The 
researchers use a multi-method analysis to convergently provide context specific explanation to 
the prevailing trend of significantly high cost overruns experienced on Niger Delta’s highway 
projects, using a geotechnical narrative.  
 
Research Design  
The case study research strategy is used to study the phenomena of unusually high cost 
overruns reported on Niger Delta’s highway projects. As Yin (2014) underscores, the most 
outstanding characteristic of a ‘case’ must be its significance, which is exemplified by the 
extreme cost overruns experienced, and the peculiar nature of the Niger Delta’s terrain. The 
technical distinctiveness of the case of Niger Delta’s highway projects, thus lends it practical 
significance in cost overrun research. This theoretical perspective therefore guided all aspects of 
the design of the case study, as depicted in Figure 1.  
 
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
The unit of analysis, towards which all data collection effort was targeted, was ‘Highway 
projects in the geologic setting of the Niger Delta’, with embedded units as shown in Figure 1. 
This study adopts a critical realist philosophical orientation as lenses suitable to understand the 
phenomenon of extreme cost overruns in Niger Delta’s highway projects. Critical realism per 
Miles and Huberman (1994) calls for both deductive and inductive reasoning to establish causal 
connections in credible ways, by providing descriptive accounts as evidence to back up the 
plausibility of such explanation.   
Following the preceding line of logic, and in tune with the critical realist philosophical 
underpinning of this research, theory on Embedded Unit of Analysis 1 (Linking ground 
conditions to cost overruns) is generated deductively via quantitative analysis, while theory on 
Embedded Unit of Analysis 2 (linking geotechnical practices to cost overruns) is generated 
inductively/deductively from qualitative data. The methodological pluralism implied by this mix 
of data types (Numerical and textual) represents a shift away from the conventional positivist 
viewpoint of most cost overrun research. As Dainty (2008) recommends, a paradigm shift in the 
ideology of construction industry research, should materialise in an increase in the use of 
qualitative methods beyond the predominance of quantitative empiricism evident in most 
scholarly text.  
 
Data Collection and Analytical Technique 
Cost and locational data from a total of 315 Infrastructure projects (buildings, canalisation, 
shore protection, and road projects) awarded from 2002 till date, were obtained from the 
available archival records of the three highway agencies responsible for highway development 
in the Niger Delta region, represented as HA1. HA2 and HA3. One hundred and Forty-eight of 
these infrastructure projects were road projects executed at various locations in the Niger Delta 
(Rivers and Bayelsa States), 61 of which were completed, while 87 were a mix of currently 
ongoing, delayed and abandoned projects. The project data was filtered down based on the 
study scope to only road projects. Furthermore, only the completed road projects were analysed, 
for their levels of cost overruns. No other form of selective sampling was adopted.  
This data analysis begins by describing the difficult heterogeneous geologic 
configuration of the Niger Delta region, and statistically explores this geotechnical undertone as 
a potential trigger which creates a propensity for cost overruns in highway projects. To this end, 
content analysis of documentary data for the 61 projects sampled was carried out. This was 
complimented by a literature survey of geo-spatial studies on the geology of the Niger Delta, 
available from the extensive work already carried out on local soils. Exploratory statistical test 
of significant difference was used to analyse recorded cost overrun data for 61 completed 
highway projects, with goal of establishing spatial association, between the geologic setting of 
the Niger Delta and cost overrun trends evident in the highway projects. 
Further to this, 16 interview were conducted with participants on the design and costing 
processes adopted by the highway agencies, during the procurement of the highway projects. 
Ten of the interviews were carried out with the technical professionals, within the highway 
agencies that commissioned the projects (HA1, HA2 and HA3). The information provided from 
these interviews, was further complimented by information elicited from six interviews 
conducted with external registered consultants and contractors, employed by the three highway 
agencies, to gather additional data related post contractual issues and cross-validate the 
information provided by the highway officials.  
A semi-structured interview format was used to draft the questions in the interview 
guide used, based on its flexibility and usefulness with respect to providing answers to the 
research questions. As such depending on the on the flow of interview conversation, certain 
questions were asked which were omitted in others. Additional questions, not originally part of 
the interview protocol, were also introduced to probe unanticipated issues that occurred during 
the interview, and which the researcher considered crucial to the study. As Bryman (1989:26) 
reiterates:  
“The research process often starts with a set of loose concepts, ideas and 
relationships between issues perceived as relevant and important in relation to the 
knowledge domain based on the investigators preoccupation ... with theoretical 
reflections filling in the gaps during data collection”. 
The collated qualitative data was analysed deductively and inductively, using the NVIVO-10, 
qualitative data analysis software, after transcribing the taped interview conversation. The 
analysis commenced using a principally deductive approach, following a theoretical framework 
derived from the literature on geotechnical best practice. The first phase of analyses of the 
interview data therefore, was structured along established standards of geotechnical best 
practice, in line with the suggestion of Yin (2003: 56):  
         “Since established theory is often the basis for formulation of initial research 
questions and objectives, the same theoretical perspectives can be deployed to 
direct the research reasoning of the study”.  
However, the 2nd phase of the qualitative data analysis was inductive, as the researchers sought 
to identify un-anticipated themes emerging from the data.   The interview transcripts were thus 
re-read to match patterns repeatedly occurring across the data. The analysis in this regard was 
carried out without following a structured theoretical framework, similar to grounded 
theorizing.  Table 2 is an outline of the logical stages of qualitative analysis deployed in the 
study for data reduction, display and inference drawing, following the recommendation of Miles 
and Huberman's (1994). 
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
As Table 2 shows, two stages of cluster analysis were carried to bring the number of 
codes down, and to a more hierarchically structured network, more specific to the objectives of 
the study: Clustering of interrelated micro-codes into more distinct subthemes; and clustering of 
sub themes into parent nodes. Some of the less distinct micro themes, which less repeatedly 
occurred were thus merged into each other, before clusters of parent themes were derived.  
Verification was further carried using an intra-case analysis of the similarity and 
contrast of responses elicited from the different groups of respondents interviewed from the 
three highway agencies. This is because unlike quantitative research which primarily seeks to 
address issues of reliability and validity, qualitative research emphasizes the relevance of social 
conditioning to the reasoning process and its role in our understanding of a phenomena. Raoke 
and Kaguoglo (2007) thus recommend that qualitative data and output should be justified and 
validated using some other supplementary methods following the three fundamental tenets of 
qualitative research. This include: the Postulate of Subjective Interpretation which requires 
studying social phenomena from  the simultaneous perceptions/viewpoints of  the actors; 
Postulate of Adequacy, which requires that explanations of human actions should be credible 
i.e. reasonable and understandable; and the Postulate of Logical Consistency which requires that 
the information being gathered and studied is consistent with the purpose of the study,  and 
relevant to the adequately operationalize the concepts being studied.   
 
The Intra-case analysis thus served as a measure necessary satisfy the Postulate of 
subjective interpretation. As Bryman (1989) further points out, cross-verification of data used 
for drawing inference in qualitative organizational studies is necessary due to potential issues 
such as:  
 
  Whether it is possible for a single informant to provide accurate information on the 
organization as a whole?  
  The possibility of variability of status of the informant affecting the reliability of 
information provided, which may have implications for the comparability of data.  
• The potential for error, ignorance bias or deliberate distortion of facts from a single 
informant.  
Using such approach, the researchers were able to match repeatedly occurring patterns, 
which also facilitated the development of reasonably coherent explanations, further satisfying 
the Postulate of Adequacy. The incorporation and triangulation of data from multiple sources 
further strengthened the adequacy of the inferences made, ensuring that premature conclusions 
were not drawn from circumstantial evidence (Miles and Huberman's 1994; Raoke and 
Kaguoglo, 2007).   The requirement of the Postulate of Logical Consistency necessary to 
adequately operationalise the study concepts, were satisfied via: the explicit definition of 
concept, case and context being studied; Identification of units of analysis, and acquiring data to 
measure them; and increasingly establishing the chain of evidence from the exploratory 
statistical analysis of archival data to the descriptive qualitative analysis of interview data. 
Furthermore, using a theoretical framework derived from the literature on geotechnical best 
practice as a proposition to guide data analysis, enhanced the analytical generalisability of the 
findings beyond the specific context of the study area. Other measures carried out, necessary to 
ensure the credibility of study’s contribution to knowledge included the preparation of pre-
designed interview templates, ethical consent and introduction letters to the study participants as 
part of the case study protocol, as well as outlining in detail the specifics of data collection 
methods and analysis.  
 
Data Analysis and Results  
 
Exploratory Data Analysis: Linking Ground Conditions to Cost Overruns  
The general geology of the Niger Delta consists of various types of sub soils.  Sub-soils 
in the riverine areas of the Niger Delta, predominantly consists of extremely soft deltaic marine 
clay locally referred to as ‘Chikoko’, with very low bearing pressure (Otoko and Pedro, 2014). 
This relative to the uplands which have firmer subsoils. The implication of this extreme 
geologic variation is its influence on earth works, the nature of pavement design, volume of 
construction materials needed, and the methods and process of construction. Typically, in terms 
of earthworks, the problematic marine clays/peat (Chikoko) soils, rated as very poor, with its 
characteristic shrinkage and swelling potential, abound to varying degrees in the geo-zones. The 
remedial re-engineering measures, as noted by several authors including Oguara (2002), 
Youdoewei and Nwankwala (2013) and Otoko (2014) could imply additional costs of earth 
works for: 
• Excavation and replacement of poor soils to the extent of prevalence, i.e. volume of cut-
to-fill/cut-to-spoil, volume of fill materials, compaction costs and the accompanying 
method and time related charges.  
• Preloading with free draining material; 
• Stabilisation in place with chemical additives to achieve the required minimum strength 
characteristic for the sub-grade.  
Typically, the first alternative will basically entail importing good quality laterites from burrow 
pits located in more stable terrain to replace the poor soils in marshy areas.  Cost of soil 
replacement will thus be subject to the haulage distance from source sheds, which are often 
situated in the coastal plain soils of the upper delta, transported via waterways, at considerable 
costs to construction sites in the swamps and along the coast.  
Against the backdrop of the preceding logic, cost overrun data on 61 completed road 
projects executed at various locations in the Niger Delta, was descriptively analysed revealing 
values which ranged up to1925% over initial estimates. The mean cost overrun value of 
216.47%, shows the unusually high cost overrun levels recorded on the sampled highway 
projects, which at a 95% confidence level, will likely still fall between 130% to 303%. The 
lower limit of this range of cost overruns is still remarkably high compared to the levels of cost 
overruns evident for highway projects reported in the literature. The dispersion of the data set 
was however not evenly distributed, but heavily skewed (3.65) with cost overrun values 
predominantly clustering around values much lower than the mean (Figure 2). 
 
Insert Figure 2 here 
 
The box plot in Figure 2, shows statistical outliers and extreme values. The skewness of the data 
thus may be due to the very conspicuous outliers noted, in order of increasing magnitude for 
project No: 3; 48; 43; 37; 52 and 49, which has dragged the mean value to be much higher than 
the median. It is however worthy of note that 5 out of the 6 outliers occur for projects executed 
in swampy and coastal areas (represented by Zone 2 and 3 in Figure 3). Figure 3 is a geo-spatial 
delineation of the Niger Delta terrain, which shows various upland, swampy and coastal 
locations as classified by Teme (2002) whereby: Zone 1-Upland; Zone 2- Swamp; and Zone 3- 
Coastal.  
 
Insert Figure 3 here 
 
 
Following Teme (2002) geo-spatial delineation, it noted that there is a wide variability 
in cost overruns values of 1925% between the minimum of 0.00 occurring in an upland location 
(Zone 1), and the maximum of 1925% occurring in a swampy location. To test if cost overruns 
recorded at various locations vary as their geo-zonation, the cost overrun data was grouped 
following this geo-demarcation and reported in Table 3.  Table 3 shows significantly differing 
levels of mean cost overrun recorded in the different geo-zones, which is further corroborated 
by the outcome an ANOVA test (Table 4), run concurrently after a log-transformation to 
normalise the data set. 
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
Insert Table 4 here 
 
As graphically represented in Figure 4, projects located in Zone-2 (swamps) display much 
higher level of cost overrun. 
Insert Figure 4 here 
 
Since relevant engineering parameters, which can only be revealed via adequate geotechnical 
evaluation, are used to assess the suitability of  the varying subsoils as bearing media prior to 
construction works, the differing levels of financial risk associated with the heterogeneity of the 
Niger Delta terrain  can be provisionally inferred as the factors which are latent in the geologic 
setting, and which have not been adequately catered for in the projection of cost figures, 
triggering the cost overrun deferential between these zones. This inference is however subject to 
the assumption that the final cost of the highway projects reflects all the relevant costs necessary 
to deliver standardized products at their various geolocations. This is due to the lack of useful 
benchmark data with which to assess the value for money to the client.  
The statistical outcome however indicates an association, and not necessarily causation. 
It thus does not rule out the possibility of other potential confounding influences typically 
project complexity, but rather serves as a platform for further in-depth investigation. It was thus 
the researcher’s interim proposition at this phase of the study that: The observed trend in the 
project data is linked to mismanaged ground related risks, which ideally ought to be clearly 
defined and tackled, but were not resolved early on at the pre-tender stage, thereby allowed to 
spill into the contractual and construction phase, leading to significantly differing levels of cost 
overruns in the geo-zones. Identifying the geotechnical shortcomings/deviations from the 
dictates of best practice, was thus considered the necessary starting point for subsequent in-
depth qualitative analysis. 
 
Deductive Interview Analysis: Linking Geotechnical Practices to Cost Overruns 
The deductive analysis followed the arguments in the literature, depicted as theoretical 
framework shown in Figure 5, which represents a linear conceptualisation of adherence to 
standards of geotechnical best practice in the project phases, and the anticipated cumulative 
impact. 
 
Insert Figure 5 here  
All respondents interviewed in the highway agencies, explained that the approach to project 
development by their respective agencies, was determined by the class/size of the road project. 
The project development processes were described as varying per the size of projects: Major or 
community road projects. Major roads were described as inter-city roads, highways and bridges, 
while community roads were the most common types of roads constructed as streets in urban 
and rural areas. It was explained that all major projects were procured via the use of external 
consultants, who handled the design preparation, while community projects were procured in-
house, with detailed preliminary engineering not necessarily undertaken.  Figure 6 is an extract 
of responses, from the interview participants to this effect. 
Insert Figure 6 here 
Community projects were further described as having no definite pre-contract procedure, being 
largely determined by the urgency induced by community pressures from youths who have 
taken up and armed struggle, due to the existing acute infrastructure backlog. Based on the 
participant responses and the analysed documentary evidence, the level of adherence to 
geotechnical best practise during the execution of the 61 projects (19 major and 42 community 
projects) was thus elicited and summarised (Table 5). 
Insert Table 5 here 
As Table 5 shows, for major projects procured byHA1 and HA2, the researchers had doubts 
about the adequacy of geotechnical investigations carried out prior to project execution, due to, 
contradictory responses obtained from participants. Typical response to this effect were:   
          “...Sometimes geotechnical investigation reports and design drawings are 
photocopied from other similar previously executed projects and modified”.  
 
“Geotechnical professionals prepare detailed soil investigation reports for major 
projects” 
Further analysis of emergent geotechnical themes (Table 6) revealed barriers contextual to the 
highway organisations, which act to facilitate poor geotechnical practises. 
Insert Table 6 here 
 
For major projects, the researcher noted a lack of continuity in the services of external 
consultants, who were responsible for ensuring geotechnical input at the design phase. This was 
inferred from the respondents’ explanations that consultants who designed major projects at the 
budgeting phase concluded all design preparation and their services were terminated: 
“… the consultants used at the post contract phase are usually different from the 
pre-contract team, as designs and costing for major projects may be prepared years 
in advance of the contract award”.   
It was noted that community projects mostly have no geotechnical professional evaluation 
throughout the phases, with resort made to crude improvisation to adjudge the nature of soils at 
project locations. In addition, the organisational structures for two out of the three highway 
agencies, revealed that no in-house geotechnical professionals were employed by either agency, 
with the responsibility for geotechnical input in the design of community highway projects.  It 
was also inferred that, that no clear-cut definition of professional roles existed within the 
highway organisations. Consequently, most professionals serve in multiple capacities. For 
example, the researcher discovered from the responses that quantity surveyors often function as 
civil engineers. A supposition confirmed by a quantity surveyor employed by HA1 who 
conformed: 
          “...I am a quantity surveyor, working under the department of ***, I can 
perform the job of an engineer and often go to site and based on the survey 
drawings, prepare schematic drawings for the road project before I estimate the 
cost.  
In HA2, a similar response was noted: 
“...I am a quantity surveyor but most times, I serve in the dual capacity of both an 
engineer and a quantity surveyor: I learnt how to prepare highway designs...”. 
It was further revealed that the agencies lacked qualified technical manpower with the requisite 
qualifications, as a result they were badly under staffed: 
 
“...The quantity surveyors and civil engineers all supervise projects, along with the 
electrical and mechanical engineers who are attached to them because we are badly 
short staffed”. 
 
 “...We have a situation, whereby hundreds of projects being executed by the 
agency, and running concurrently, are managed and supervised by less than 10 
persons. Most of the so-called engineers are not experienced and don’t even have 
adequate qualifications”. 
There were also instances of job descriptions not matching the qualifications of staff working on 
road projects. It was discovered that completely unrelated (non-construction) professionals were 
working in the capacity of project managers and supervisors.  This was captured in the very 
revealing statement from the management staff of the agency in which it was admitted: 
“... We have cases of medical doctors, accountants, marine engineers and even 
petroleum engineers, heading departments in charge of road projects, and working 
as project managers: supervising projects and approving remittance of payment to 
contractors. 
From the outcome of the deductive interview data analysis an array of factors, relative to 
standards of geotechnical practice, was thus identified as contributing to the unusually high 
levels of cost overruns in the highway projects, summarily presented in Table 7. 
Insert Table 7 here 
 
Inductive Interview Analysis 
The Inductive phase of the data analysis, sought to highlight recurring patterns across the data. 
The response pattern revealed a lack of control gateways in project development phases. The 
responses revealed that projects had no definite procedure for approval, with budget estimates 
mostly prepared using approximate quantities. Typical responses are captured in Figure 7. 
 
Insert Figure 7 here 
 
 
 
Further inductive analysis of the interview data, highlighted the dominant role of people, and 
external factors particularly from political interference and community pressures, inherent in the 
institutional system, as impacting on the level of cost overruns recorded on projects. Eight out 
of the ten participants interviewed from the highway agencies commented on the impact of 
these on their professional roles. Typical participant responses to this effect are shown in the 
interview extract (Figure 8). 
Insert Figure 8 
 
 
Table 8 is an array of socio-culturally constructed forces as induced, which constitute the 
contextual drivers in the highway organizations actively triggering geotechnical error traps, and 
have trickled down to result in the unusually high levels of cost overruns experienced in 
highway projects in the Niger Delta. 
Insert Table 8 here 
 
Discussion of Finding 
The observations inferred from the preliminary statistical analysis served to reinforce the 
researcher’s predisposition that the heterogenous wetland conditions of the Niger Delta are 
linked to the extreme cost overruns experienced on Niger Delta’s highway projects. The 
findings from the statistical analysis at face value appear to corroborate the assertions of the 
highway agencies, that the region’s geology is the primary factor underlying the trend in cost 
overruns. However, the findings were only exploratory and not conclusive. necessitating further 
qualitative analysis to uncover what practise based issues within the highway agencies, are 
responsible for triggering the excessive level of cost overruns on the projects. 
The findings from the deductive phase of the interview demonstrates the link between poor 
geotechnical practises and cost overruns reinforcing the study’s presopposition that a lack of 
adequate geotechnical risk management is fundamental to the extreme cost overruns recorded 
on Niger Delta’s highway projects. Typically, noted was the practice of using non-differentiated 
costing platforms in budgetary provision for proposed highway projects at the preliminary 
phases of highway development, despite the heterogeneous sub-soil profile of the Niger Delta 
region. The findings also showed that there is a predominant lack of rigorous ground 
explorations, needed for the preparation of adequate and comprehensive designs for highway 
projects. This is compounded by a lack of adequate geotechnical risk containment measures-via 
GIR and DSC clauses, in contracts awarded by the highway agencies This is amidst the 
primarily subjectively and politically driven mode of contractor selection, which is not based on 
any form of geotechnical criteria, requisite to ensure efficiency of project execution.  
Particularly the lack of detailed preliminary engineering has considerable implications 
for the certainty of project outturn costs- which is further amplified, as the diagnosis of 
problematic expansive soil types typical of the wetland condition of the Niger Delta, at the pre-
contract phase is necessary if the project team are to address relevant risk and competently 
estimate costs. This raises the question of value for money to the client, as the project delivered 
may not necessarily be a standard one, logically linked to the rather robust body of literature 
centred on investigating the high incidence of premature road failure in the region (Abam, 2005; 
Aigbedion, 2007; Emujakporue, 2012).  
This places a limitation on the preceding analysis, as to conclusively establish cause-
effect relation between ground conditions and cost overruns would ultimately require some 
form of benchmark figure per kilometre of standard highway sizes related to particular 
classifications of ground conditions, which with the practices uncovered, is not possible. 
Therefore, a technically competent evaluation of the highway projects is a precursor to further 
quantitative investigation into the more immediate and project, specific causes. 
Further inductive analysis uncovers a link between project governance and project 
management and cost overruns, highlighting the role of organization and people related 
variables within socio-cultural settings, as complimentary cost overrun drivers in highway 
projects. These in turn represent an additional layer of risk contextual to the system of project 
delivery in the Niger Delta. Typically, these include the:  
§ Poorly Constituted Organizational Environment in the various highway agencies, 
which has served to actively create geotechnical error traps in highway projects;  
§ Knowledge and Skills Gap evident in the general pattern of the responses. The 
participant responses showed that most of the in-house professionals, were 
significantly uninformed about current issues in their profession, which clearly had 
a significant bearing on their ability to follow the underlying logic behind the line 
of questioning. This evident gap in the knowledge of the highway officials, can thus 
be said to be the blue prints, which fosters dysfunctional professional practices, that 
actively facilitates error traps in highway projects. 
§ External Socio-Cultural Pressures which has impacted on the professional 
obligation of project actors. Particularly the impact of political and community 
interference on in-house professional roles during the procurement of projects is 
particularly noted by the researcher as being a ‘blanket’ influence in the Niger 
Delta, overwhelming all other considerations in the procurement of highway 
projects. This was evident in the data, which showed the numerous multiplier 
impacts that external pressure from political and community sources, has had in 
constraining, the discharge of professional obligations. 
§ Psychological Barriers, which are put up by the professional actors in highway 
projects, in response to their level of risk perception of geotechnical issues as well 
as due to social conditioning inherent in the institutional setting of the highway 
organisations.  
§ Dichotomous Project Management Practices indicative of unbalanced management 
of geotechnical risk, which is a recipe that would logically culminate in significant 
cost overruns.  
§ Unethical Practices noted as thriving within the highway agencies, which may be 
associated with the pre/post contract management of highway projects executed in 
the Niger Delta. The researcher, however, cannot generalize the prevalence of such 
un-ethical practices to all project actors in the professional service of the highway 
agencies. Yet, based on the responses from the highway agencies’ staff, the 
researcher has, however, discovered the existence of internal organizational 
loopholes, which create a viable ground for such unethical practices, where they do 
occur, to thrive.  
Triangulation of the findings from the study analysis show that the problem of cost overruns in 
the Niger Delta is multi-layered and multi-dimensional, underlain by a web of interconnected 
contextual drivers. As Figure 9 depicts, there are major contextual governance faults and 
knowledge deficiencies in the system of highway project delivery in the Niger Delta which has 
trickled down to trigger excessive cost overruns. 
 
Insert Figure 9 here  
 
 
 
 
As observed from the data, there are project governance and project management 
dysfunctionalities, which requires a major culture shift and transformation framework in the 
highway project environment to allow for proper risk management and procurement processes. 
Overcoming the predominantly poor geotechnical risk management practices evident in 
highway organizations requires adherence to best practices by suitably technically skilled staff. 
This however can only be possible whereby the organizational environment is made conducive, 
corroborating the viewpoints of Sowers (1993) and Beau (2006) that the human factor in 
geotechnical risk management is fundamental to the project failures and successes. As a result, 
the link between ground conditions and cost overruns cannot easily be isolated and understood 
unless the other overwhelming influences are functioning properly.  
 
Conclusion  
The study has provided a descriptive snapshot of the practices of the highway agencies in the 
Niger Delta, which shows that the reality of the situation of project delivery in the region, 
depicts a far departure from the theory of good practice. The study provides empirical evidence 
which reinforces the general view that the system of highway project delivery in the Niger Delta 
is fraught with numerous anomalies. This has impacted on the level of geotechnical risk 
containment on projects. As the study reveals, poor project governance has led to poor project 
management and procurement practices, inhibiting the implementation of good management of 
geotechnical risk necessary to minimize financial risks due to the inherently adverse ground 
conditions at project sites. The combination of these negative vices has created a propensity for 
extreme cost overruns on the highway projects, considering the wetland geologic setting of the 
Niger Delta. The study outcome has thus provided empirical evidence showcasing the 
contribution of mismanaged geotechnical risks to cost overruns experienced on highway project 
delivery in the Niger Delta.  
The study further demonstrates the relevance of context to the argument on cost 
overruns, in public infrastructure projects, uncovering a wide array of social constructs, 
concomitantly at play in the highway project based organisations-which would have been 
overlooked in typically reductionist positivist studies. The robustness of the study findings has 
thus illustrated how adding contextual exploration of the cost overrun problem beyond mere 
statistics can add depth and richness to understanding the complex web of issues driving cost 
overruns in infrastructure projects. Cost overrun explanations therefore, should take into 
consideration the process and context– simplistic generalisations from statistical analysis only, 
would likely not yield a holistic understanding of the problem. The broader theoretical 
implication of this therefore lies in advancing the following nexus: the phenomenon of cost 
overrun in infrastructure projects should be numerically as well as contextually anchored. 
 The underlying drivers to cost overruns in projects, therefore cannot be properly 
understood if divorced from the organizational and project environment in which it occurred. As 
observed in this study, investigation into the impact of the precise impact of geotechnical risk 
upon costs, which ultimately should be the starting point for managing the risks involved, 
requires that the investigation has to travel back up through, and deal with the contextual and 
governance factors at the upper levels that are causing the problems lower down. The policy 
implication being the need for relevant institutional authorities to maintain a conducive 
organizational platform in highway agencies that gives adherence to best practise a priority.  It 
is thus recommended that tackling cost overruns in highway projects requires concerted and 
specifically targeted efforts, aimed at curbing the intrinsic contextual triggers within and 
external to highway organisations. 
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